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Summary
Understanding the maintenance of cooperation requires an
understanding of the nature of cheaters and the strategies
used to mitigate their effects. However, it is often difficult to
determine how cheating or differential social success has
arisen. For example, cheaters may employ different strate-
gies (e.g., fixed and facultative), whereas other causes of
unequal fitness in social situations can result in winners
and losers without cheating. To address these problems,
we quantified the social successof naturally occurring geno-
types of Dictyostelium discoideum during the formation of
chimeric fruiting bodies, consisting of dead stalk cells and
viable spores. We demonstrate that an apparent competitive
dominance hierarchy of spore formation in chimera is partly
due to a fixed strategy where genotypes exhibit dramatically
different spore allocations. However, we also find complex,
variable facultative strategies,wheregenotypes change their
allocation in chimera. By determining the magnitude and
direction of these changes, we partition facultative cheating
into two forms: (1) promotion of individual fitness through
selfish behaviour (‘‘self-promotion’’) and (2) coercion of
other genotypes to act cooperatively. Our results demon-
strate and define social interactions between D. discoideum
isolates, thusprovidingaconceptual framework for thestudy
of the genetic mechanisms that underpin social evolution.
Results and Discussion
Within social groups, the self interests of cooperating individ-
uals are in conflict because selection favors exploitive
cheaters who maximize their own fitness by performing less
of the costly cooperative act [1]. This broad definition of social
cheaters can, however, cause confusion because it often leads
to the assumption that differential fitness among cooperating
individuals can be used as a measure of social success, and
hence of cheating. However, differential success in social
interactions can arise from many causes. For example, natural
selection could favor different ecological or life-history strate-
gies that indirectly lead to varying social success. On the other
hand, differences in inherent fitness could be a consequence
of different evolved ‘‘fixed’’ social strategies that affect both
social and nonsocial fitness but have evolved specifically as
social strategies. Finally, individuals may also employ social
strategies that are facultative, either in the sense that they
depend on the specific social partner(s) encountered or in
that they are invoked in the presence of social partners but
are differentially expressed otherwise.
*Correspondence: jason@evolutionarygenetics.org (J.B.W.), christopher.
thompson@manchester.ac.uk (C.R.L.T.)These issues can be illustrated by the social amoeba Dic-
tyostelium discoideum, a model system for studying coopera-
tion and cheating [2–10]. Upon starvation, up to 100,000
amoebae aggregate and differentiate to form a fruiting body
composed of dead stalk cells that hold aloft a sporehead
bearing hardy spores [11]. Different genotypes will aggregate
to produce a chimeric fruiting body, resulting in potential
conflict over which genotype(s) will ‘‘sacrifice’’ themselves to
produce the stalk and which will contribute to the sporehead
and hence have direct reproductive fitness. Perfect coopera-
tion in chimeric fruiting bodies implies that genotypes evenly
divide the advantages of spore production and the burden of
stalk formation. Consequently, deviations from a uniform divi-
sion of the sporehead could be seen to indicate social exploi-
tation. In this scenario, genotypes could cheat to increase their
representation in the sporehead through two broad strategies:
fixed or variable allocation [12]. In a fixed allocation strategy,
genotypes have intrinsic differences in allocation to spores
versus stalk cells, resulting in differential representation in
the sporehead in paired interactions. However, such variation
in inherent allocation strategies is not necessarily a con-
sequence of the evolution of differential social strategies.
Instead, natural selection could favor different (equally fit)
spore:stalk allocation ratios that maximize a potential trade-
off [12, 13] between spore number and dispersal. In contrast,
in a variable allocation strategy, genotypes show different
spore:stalk allocation patterns when in competition (a
chimera) compared to their clonal pattern because of the
social interaction. Such facultative cheaters could be recog-
nized as individuals or genotypes that gain disproportionately
more spores when in competition compared to that expected
given their inherent allocation. These differences could result
when the ‘‘winning’’ genotype increases its spore production,
with the ‘‘loser’’ increasing less or staying the same. Alterna-
tively, coercion could occur, with the winner forcing the loser
to reduce its spore production while the winner’s production
decreases less, stays the same, or even increases.
This study aims to disentangle these different scenarios by
quantifying the degree to which both fixed and variable alloca-
tion strategies contribute to the spore allocation of naturally
occurring strains of D. discoideum during social competition.
Variation in Spore Allocation Results in a Dominance
Hierarchy
It has been shown that natural isolates of D. discoideum form
a near linear ‘‘dominance hierarchy’’ when developed in
chimera from equal initial frequencies [8]. We confirmed this
result for six of these clones developed as chimeras in all 15
pairwise combinations (Kendall’s test for linearity, d5 = 0, p <
0.05; Figure 1A; see also Table S1, available online). We next
tested whether inherent variation across genotypes in alloca-
tion to spore versus stalk when developed clonally, in the
absence of competition, could account for this hierarchy. We
found highly significant differences in total spore numbers
across the six genotypes, with a 2.8-fold difference between
the highest and lowest allocators, and significant pair-wise
difference between all genotypes (one-way ANOVA, F5,184 =
94.25, p < 0.001; Table S1 and Figure S1A). This was consistent
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volume ratios (see Figure S1B) between the genotypes (one-
way ANOVA, F5,126 = 22.618, p < 0.001), with the two measure-
ments of spore:stalk allocation showing a significant degree
of correspondence to one another (Kendall’s tau, t5 = 0.600,
p < 0.05).
The rank order of clones as a function of their inherent spore
allocation (Figure 1B) is concordant with their representation in
the sporehead during chimeric development, except for geno-
types E and F (Figure 1A). This result strongly suggests that
those genotypes that appear most competitively dominant
during chimeric development are simply those whose fixed
strategy is to allocate more of their cells to spores.
Frequency-Independent Interactions in Chimera
Two predictions follow if the outcome of competition is wholly
dependent on inherent clonal allocation: (1) allocation of cells to
spores by genotypes within chimera should be independent of
input frequency; (2) Allocation of amoebae to spores and stalk
for one genotype within a chimera should be fixed and indepen-
dent of its competitor’s genotype. This implies that the relative
spore allocation (hereafter referred to as fitness) of both geno-
types in an interacting pair should be predictable on the basis
of their respective clonal (inherent) spore allocation.
To test these predictions, we quantified the pairwise fitness
(wij) of all clones during chimeric development across a range
of initial genotypic frequencies. Consistent with the first
prediction, the competitive interactions between 14 of the 15
pairs were found to follow a fixed fitness model (all p values <
0.005). See Tables S2 and S3 and Figure S2 for the individual
patterns, p values, and raw data, plus the Experimental Proce-
dures for details on these models. The simplest explanation for
this pattern is that genotypic spore allocation remained fixed
during both clonal and chimeric development. However, in
contrast to the second prediction, we found that, for most
Figure 1. Three Alternative Linear Hierarchies Created from the Data on the
Six Genotypes A to F
(A) This hierarchy is constructed from the ability of each genotype to be
overrepresented in the sporehead (Kendall test for linearity, d5 = 0, p <
0.05). The ‘‘y’’ indicates that one pair showed a negatively frequency-depen-
dent pattern.
(B) The ‘‘null’’ hierarchy constructed from the inherent spore allocation of
each genotype. It assumes that there is no interaction between genotypes
and that spore allocation remains constant irrespective of frequency and
the presence of other genotypes.
(C) The hierarchy measured in termsof ‘‘social success,’’ i.e., ability tocheat by
self-promotion and social coercion. The ‘‘*’’ indicates that genotype B is diffi-
cult to place in the social success hierarchy and this position is an estimate.pairs, the observed representation of genotypes in chimeric
fruiting bodies was different to that expected from their
inherent allocations (Table S2 and Figure S2). This implies
that, although allocation to spore versus stalk remains
constant for both partners within a pair of interacting geno-
types, it is variable between pairs. Thus rather than fixed
fitness arising from a fixed pattern of spore:stalk allocation,
indicating the absence of interactions, this result reveals
a complex array of interactions between social competitors,
where the spore:stalk allocation of a focal genotype depends
on the genotype of its competitor.
Chimerism Results in Increased Spore Production
The above results suggest that individuals facultatively deviate
from their inherent allocation during social interactions as
a function of their social competitor’s genotype. We therefore
tested whether total spore production was affected by this
change. Chimeric fruiting bodies of 14 of 15 pairs were found
to contain a higher overall proportion of spores than expected
if there were no interactions, with 11 of these differences being
significant (one-sample t tests; see Table 1; see also Table S4
for raw data). Morphometric spore:stalk volume ratio data for
the pairwise interactions between three genotypes (A, C, and
E) also supported these data (exp a(A+C) = 0.7363, obs a(A+C) =
0.7622 6 0.007, one-sample t test, t15 = 3.588, p = 0.003; exp
a(A+E) = 0.6604, obs a(A+E) = 0.7951 6 0.028, t16 = 4.768, p <
0.001; exp a(C+E) = 0.5594, obs a(C+E) = 0.7176 6 0.019, t16 =
8.455, p < 0.001). We draw three main conclusions from these
results. First, despite frequency-independent fitness, geno-
types within chimeric fruiting bodies interact and display facul-
tative responses to social interactions. Second, both geno-
types show a shift in spore allocation that is associated with
significant deviations in fruiting body architecture. Third, as
most interactions lead to an increase in spore number, there
is a correlated increase in total spore production within
chimera (see Conclusions).
Quantifying ‘‘Social Success’’
Although 50:50 chimeric mixes result in changes in the propor-
tional allocation to spores versus stalk (Table 1), these data
alone do not indicate the direction of the facultative change
Table 1. Observed and Expected Overall Proportion of Amoebae




Expected A B C D E F
A O - 1.5599a 1.5276 1.4162 1.3585 1.2190
E 1.3559 1.2902 1.1789 1.1003 0.9730
B O - 1.4260 1.3149 0.9502b 0.9921a
E 1.2051 1.0937 1.0151 0.8878
C O - 1.1797a 1.3089 1.0686
E 1.0280 0.9494 0.8221
D O - 0.9855 0.9673
E 0.8381 0.7108




Observed allocations (O) are from total spore counts of chimeras (see Table
S4 for raw data and standard errors); expected allocations (E) are from total
spores counts of clonal fruiting bodies and are calculated with Equations
1 and 2.
a Significance level 0.10 > p > 0.05.
b Nonsignificant decrease in spore allocation.
Self-Promotion and Coercion in a Social Amoeba
1375in allocation of individual genotypes within these fruiting
bodies. To determine this, we quantified the competitive allo-
cation of each genotype within each pair, where competitive
allocation is a function of both relative fitness and the propor-
tion of spores in the chimeric fruiting body (see Equation 3). We
then calculated the deviation of competitive spore allocation
from that expected on the basis of the inherent allocation of
each genotype. The magnitude and direction of the deviation
provide a direct measure of the influence of the social interac-
tion on spore allocation (Table 2). We observed two modes
through which genotypes could gain social success via
increasing their proportional representation of spores in the
sporehead: selfish self-promotion and coercion. The former
is recognized as an ability to increase the relative proportion
of one’s own cells to spore versus stalk and would result in
the tendency for competitive allocation to deviate positively,
whereas the latter is recognized as an ability to decrease the
relative proportion of cells a competitor is allocating to spores,
thereby driving it to disproportionately contribute to stalk. This
would result in either a negative allocation deviation or
a smaller positive deviation for competitor genotypes.
By these measures we detected a broad range of social
interactions between the six strains. Most remarkably, we
found that all strains could be both exploiter and exploited,
with the magnitude of these responses being both strain and
pair dependent (Table 2). Averaging across all paired interac-
tions, 5 of 6 isolates were strong self-promoters, whereas
one performed poorly in both social aspects (Figure 2 and
Table 2). We found that a genotype’s inherent allocation was
not significantly correlated with its ability to socially coerce
(r = 0.642, 0.05 < p < 0.10) or its ability to self-promote (r =
0.591, 0.2 < p < 0.3). However, we found that the ability of
a genotype to self-promote is strongly correlated with its
ability to coerce other genotypes (r = 0.955, 0.001 < p <
0.005; see Figure 2). Partitioning social interactions in this
way enabled a dominance hierarchy to be produced, where
genotypes are ordered in their relative ability to self-promote
and coerce others (Figure 1C). This social hierarchy is based
on measures of variable allocation and removes any effects
of fixed allocation and differs strikingly from the hierarchy
generated on the basis of either relative fitness or inherent allo-
cation (Figures 1A and 1B). These differences indicate that the
former hierarchies can cause misleading conclusions about
Table 2. Deviations in Competitive Spore Allocation of Each Genotype
Compared to Their Inherent Allocation in Mixed Competition
Genotype A B C D E F
Ability to
Promote
A - 0.4832 0.0865 0.2686 0.3007 0.4361 0.3150
B 20.0753 - 0.4415 0.1354 0.2813 0.3060 0.2178
C 0.3069 0.0003 - 0.3829 1.0666 0.5394 0.4592
D 0.2061 0.3069 20.0796 - 0.6604 0.5607 0.3309
E 0.2156 20.4112 20.3477 20.3655 - 20.1579 20.2133
F 0.0559 20.0975 20.0464 20.0477 0.4935 - 0.0715
Ability to
Coerce
20.1418 20.0563 20.0108 20.0747 20.5605 20.3369 0.1969
A mean deviation of 0.1969 demonstrates that genotypes generally increase
their spore allocation in chimera. The ability to promote is calculated with
Equation 5. A negative value corresponds to a decrease in allocation and
a positive value to an increase in allocation in competition. A genotype’s
ability to coerce is calculated with Equation 6. A positive value means that
the genotype is able to coerce others, and a negative value means a geno-
type is coerced by others.the nature of competitive social interactions to be drawn and
fail to illuminate the mechanisms of social exploitation.
Conclusions
Unequal representation of genotypes within the sporehead in
socially developing species like D. discoideum has been taken
as evidence for social exploitation [7, 8]. This conclusion relies
on the assumption of a single optimal stalk:spore allocation
ratio among natural genotypes, implying that fair cooperation
should result in equal division of the sporehead. The results
shown here reveal that this assumption is violated in D. discoi-
deum, where all genotypes examined differ significantly from
one another in their inherent proportional allocation to spore
and stalk during clonal development. One interpretation of
these results is that there are widespread fixed cheating strat-
egies [12]. Alternatively, however, differential social success
could be attributed to natural selection’s favoring of different
inherent spore:stalk allocation ratios that each differently opti-
mize a spore:stalk trade-off. This idea is supported by the
finding that chimerism may be relatively rare in D. discoideum,
implying that natural selection for nonsocial traits may be the
primary force in maintaining variation in allocation ratios [3].
Regardless, our results demonstrate that differences in fixed
allocation can explain apparent competitive differences be-
tween interacting genotypes (Figures 1A and 1B).
Although a fixed allocation strategy can explain competitive
differences among genotypes in terms of spore production,
our results demonstrate that genotypes show significant vari-
ation during social competition. These shifts provide evidence
for the existence of facultative cheating behavior, indicating
that exploitative social interactions appear to be widespread.
Using the estimates of spore allocation during social competi-
tion, we detected two strategies of social exploitation: self-
promotion and coercion (Table 2), resulting in a dispropor-
tionate shift in allocation during competition. The former is
due to a response directly causing positive effects, and the
latter is mediated by a form of coercion that reduces compet-
itors’ fitness and thereby benefits the coercer.
At present, the molecular mechanisms underlying these strat-
egies remain unknown. The social responses may be passive,
Figure 2. Scatter Plot Showing the Relationship between the Ability to Self-
Promote and the Ability to Coerce
There is a strong positive correlation between the two variables (r = 0.955,
0.001 < p < 0.005); p values adjusted for any autocorrelation between
measures (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
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ation in receptor sensitivity [14]. However, it is not clear how
such a scenario could explain the diversity of responses
observed when genotypes are paired with different partners.
Consequently, we believe that a more likely explanation for
the observed behavior is that, at least in some cases, genotypes
recognize and adaptively respond to the presence of nonself
during competition. Indeed, self/nonself recognition is known
inD.discoideumand other congeners [3, 15, 16]. A central focus
of future work will be to identify the signaling systems or path-
ways mediating these interactions, with diffusible signaling
molecules known to affect cell fate, such as cAMP and DIF-1,
representing good candidates [17–20].
We find that most genotypes cheat through self-promotion,
a competitive strategy that generally causes an increase in
total spore production and altered fruiting body architecture
(Tables 1 and 2). Although these findings support the idea
that chimerism results in increased fitness [2] in terms of total
spore production, it comes at a cost to stalk production,
potentially decreasing overall fitness. At the extreme, consis-
tent with the intraspecific Red Queen model [21], it is possible
to envision cycles of increasing spore allocation in chimeras
eventually creating fruiting bodies with much-reduced stalks
and huge sporeheads. In this ‘‘all defect’’ strategy, group
fitness would decline sufficiently that any additional ‘‘self-
promotion’’ would be considered spiteful. Consequently,
coercion may have evolved as a mechanism to counterbalance
this process by enforcing other genotypes to produce stalk,
thereby avoiding this spiteful end.
In some systems, cheating and coercion can be directly
mechanistically separated. For example, in many social in-
sects some workers lay eggs (cheating), whereas other non-
reproductive workers remove them (enforcement by worker
policing) [22]. However, our data reveal that the act of cheat-
ing in D. discoideum (producing more spores) is strongly
correlated with the act of coercion (making the other strain
make more stalk). It is therefore also possible that a single
mechanism underlies both traits. This could be a consequence
of the fact that social behavior in D. discoideum is intrinsically
dependent on cell-cell interactions and a highly coordinated
developmental program in which all the cells respond to the
common set of signals that link spore and stalk production.
Our findings highlight the importance of distinguishing
between fixed and facultative social strategies when consid-
ering social behavior. In D. discoideum, identifying genotypes
that simply have disproportionate sporehead representation is
insufficient to identify cheaters or the method by which cheat-
ing occurs. For example, fixed differences in inherent alloca-
tion can lead to competitive differences between isolates,
but such differences may arise from nonsocial causes and
need not imply exploitation. For this reason we believe that
facultative strategies that result in changes in the expected
fitness of a genotype or its competitor provide the clearest
measure of cheating ability. We find that when this is used as
a measure of social success, or cheating ability, it is uncorre-
lated with inherent fitness (allocation). By focusing on how
the fitness of genotypes changes as a result of social interac-
tions, we have revealed a broader and more functionally rele-
vant set of competitive and exploitative strategies in naturally
occurring genotypes of D. discoideum. Our results highlight
the importance of fully understanding the nature of interac-
tions between social organisms for the identification and defi-
nition of social genes. More importantly, they provide valuable
insights into the evolutionary consequences of the strategiesthat take place, aiding the application of social evolution
theory to real, interacting populations of individuals.
Experimental Procedures
Strain Maintenance, Growth, and Development
Focal genotypes (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) were grown
on Schaeffer’s sporulation medium (SM) agar plates with Klebsiella aero-
genes and developed on 1.5% KK2 (16.1 mM KH2PO4, 3.7mM K2HPO4)
agar plates at a density of 1.6 3 106 amoebae/cm2. Spore allocation was
calculated by dividing total spore number by the initial number of cells
added to the development plate. Cell Tracker (Molecular Probes; see [23])
was used to label strains and identify spore genotypes in chimeras.
Sorus and stalk volumes were estimated from digital images of the six
strains (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
Determining Fitness and Spore Allocation
The expected proportions for a pair of genotypes i and j after development






where pt and qt are the proportions of genotypes i and jbefore development,
pt+1 is the proportion of i after development, wij is a coefficient describing
the relative representation of genotype i in the sporehead when in chimera
with j, and wji describes the relative representation of genotype jwhen with i






where aij and aji are the spore allocations of genotypes i when with j and j
when with i, respectively. In the case of observed wij values, aij and aji refer
to ‘‘competitive allocation,’’ measured in genotype mixes. However, when
expected fitness was calculated, the value of aii was substituted for aij
and ajj was substituted for aji, where the values aii and ajj refer to ‘‘inherent
allocation’’ (i.e., allocation when developing clonally). Estimates of wij and
wji in Equation 1 were fitted by least-squares with data from Table S4 itera-
tively by finding the fitness values associated with the lowest sum of
squared deviations of the observed proportions after development (pt+1)
from those expected. See Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
details of the frequency-dependent model.
The competitive allocation (i.e., allocation of the spores in mixed compe-
tition) of a genotype was estimated as a function of its proportion of spores
in the sporehead (relative fitness) and the size of the chimeric sporehead
itself:
aij = 2$wij$ai + j (3)
where ai+j is the proportion of amoebae becoming spores in a 50:50 chimeric
mixture of i and j (estimates of these values are derived from total spore
count experiments). The 2 in Equation 3 appears because genotype imakes
up only half of the mixture. The deviation of the competitive allocation of
genotype i in chimera with genotype j compared to its clonal allocation, dij
(i.e., the variable allocation component for a genotype within a particular
pair), was calculated simply as:
dij = aij 2aii (4)
Measures of social success were calculated in two ways: ability to self-
promote and ability to coerce. A genotype’s ability to self-promote was
calculated simply as a genotype’s mean deviation (di ) when in competition







where n is the total number of genotypes. Under this measure, good self-
promoters increase the relative proportion of their cells that become spore
versus stalk, independent of the influence they have on their social partners.
The ability of a genotype to coerce other genotypes was calculated simi-
larly, but it is based on the mean deviation of its competitive partners’ spore
allocation (i.e., the column mean, ci ), rather than its own spore allocation.







The deviation is negative so that a genotype that generally depresses
others in competition achieves a positive (or less negative) value in its ability
to coerce. Under this measure, a successful coercer is able to decrease allo-
cation to spores by other genotypes, thereby forcing them to make more of
the stalk.
To test whether there was a significant relationship between self-promo-
tion, social coercion, and inherent spore allocation, we generated signifi-
cance thresholds for the correlation coefficient by using a random simula-
tion of the allocation patterns (i.e., of the allocation matrix shown in Table
2) under a true null hypothesis of no relationship (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures).
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include Supplemental Experimental Procedures, two
figures, and four tables and can be found with this article online at http://
www.cell.com/current-biology/supplemental/S0960-9822(09)01375-X.
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